Sour Chocolate: The U.K. Takeover Panel\u27s Improper Reaction to Kraft\u27s Acquisition of Cadbury by Patrone, Michael R.
Brigham Young University International Law & Management
Review
Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 5
12-20-2011
Sour Chocolate: The U.K. Takeover Panel's
Improper Reaction to Kraft's Acquisition of
Cadbury
Michael R. Patrone
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the Business
Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
International Law & Management Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael R. Patrone, Sour Chocolate: The U.K. Takeover Panel's Improper Reaction to Kraft's Acquisition of Cadbury, 8 BYU Int'l L. &
Mgmt. R. 63 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr/vol8/iss1/5
  
SOUR CHOCOLATE: THE U.K. TAKEOVER PANEL’S 
IMPROPER REACTION TO KRAFT’S ACQUISITION OF 
CADBURY 
 
Michael R. Patrone
* 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article critiques the U.K. Takeover Panel Code Committee’s 
proposals to amend the U.K. Takeover Code in response to Kraft’s 
acquisition of Cadbury, on the premise that well-founded takeover law 
and regulation should focus on fair process and leave socioeconomic 
factors and foreign investment regulation to other areas of the law. After 
outlining the United Kingdom’s takeover regime and the Takeover 
Panel’s review of the Takeover Code, this article offers a critique of two 
specific proposed reforms contained in the Takeover Panel Report. This 
article then questions the effectiveness of the regime under the Takeover 
Panel Report’s proposals and introduces an alternative approach to 
fulfilling the Takeover Panel’s goals that the Panel missed. This article 
concludes by calling for additional research to determine the proper 
course and proposals the Panel should take. 
  
                                                     
* J.D. 2011, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Professor John C. Coates for his 
invaluable supervision and support and my colleagues Josh Podoll and Joseph Vardner for their help 
and insights. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
The international, cross-border merger boom has not been without 
social and political consequences. Cadbury/Kraft, a $19 billion hostile-
turned-friendly takeover in 2010, illustrated sound execution of the 
United Kingdom’s board neutrality regime but tested a nation’s resolve 
of its underlying policies. Kraft’s pursuit of Cadbury was public and 
drawn-out, dating back to August 2009 when Cadbury management first 
received, and dismissed, a merger proposal from Kraft.
1
 The ensuing 
battle did not result in a formal bid until November 2009 and involved: 
(1) numerous outside parties, including the U.K. Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers (Takeover Panel), Nestle, Hershey’s, and investor Warren 
Buffett,
2
 and (2) a mandatory bid-or-walk-away order from the Takeover 
Panel.
3
 Cadbury shareholders, aided by short-term investors, 
arbitrageurs, and hedge funds that purchased shares after Kraft 
announced its initial interest in Cadbury, ultimately decided that the deal 
for the chocolate manufacturer was too sweet to pass up despite the 
Cadbury Board’s opinion that the offer price was too low.4 Rather than 
succumb to the hostile bid, the Cadbury Board revised its position and 
negotiated a friendly sale to Kraft, agreed to Kraft’s revised proposal in 
January 2010, and recommended that shareholders vote for the deal.
5
  
In the months that followed the American company’s acquisition of 
the 186-year-old British icon, Kraft reversed its stance against closing 
Cadbury plants in the United Kingdom and announced that it would 
close the Somerdale chocolate plant in Keynsham, despite widespread 
public protests and resistance from U.K. regulators.
6
 During the 
acquisition process, critics of the acquisition frequently cited Cadbury 
job losses as a likely outcome of the deal, but Kraft executives deflected 
these concerns during the bidding period and reiterated the company’s 
                                                     
1 David Jones, TIMELINE—Kraft Agrees Cadbury Deal After 4-month Fight, REUTERS, Jan. 
19, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/19/cadbury-kraft-idUSLDE60E0XI20 100119.  
2 Id.; see also AP, Warren Buffet Opposed Kraft-Cadbury Merger, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/05/AR201001050 3860.html 
(discussing Berkshire Hathaway’s, Warren Buffet’s investment group, opinion on Kraft’s purchase 
of Cadbury).  
3AP, supra note 2. A mandatory bid-or-walk-away deadline, also called a “put up or shut up” 
deadline, is a provision that was added to the Takeover Code in 2004 and designed to protect U.K. 
companies from prolonged siege and extended “virtual bid periods.” Under this approach, a bidder 
must submit a formal bid within twenty-eight days of formally announcing an intention to make an 
offer for a target company. If the bidder has not yet made a formal announcement, the target 
company can request that the Takeover Panel implement a “put up or shut up” period that begins the 
twenty-eight day time period. See The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code r. 2.4, 
Mar. 30, 2009 (U.K.) [hereinafter Takeover Code]. The current version of the Takeover Code is 
available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk (follow “Download Code as PDF” hyperlink). 
4 Michael J. de la Merced & Chris V. Nicholson, Kraft to Acquire Cadbury in Deal Worth $19 
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/business/ 
global/20kraft.html. 
5 Id. 
6 Cecile Rohwedder & Alistair MacDonald, Kraft Faces Probe on Cadbury, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870391520457510400210 0336526.html 
(citing Kraft’s intent to move the Keynsham plant). Contra de la Merced & Nicholson, supra note 4 
(quoting Kraft executives that it would be a “net importer” of jobs into the United Kingdom). 
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stance on increasing jobs in the United Kingdom.
7
 After the sale, Kraft 
announced that it would shift the manufacturing activities of this plant to 
Poland. This announcement further angered the local workforce and 
labor unions and provoked a growing sense of economic nationalism.
8
 
This decision prompted the Takeover Panel to investigate whether Kraft 
misled investors.
9
 Since the Takeover Panel can only levy private and 
public reprimands, the investigation was not a true threat to Kraft.
10
  
Facing mounting public pressure and backlash from Cadbury’s 
acquisition, in February 2010, the Takeover Panel commenced a review 
of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (Takeover Code) with 
particular focus on the regulations that govern the unsolicited takeovers 
of U.K. companies. The Takeover Panel cited Kraft’s takeover of 
Cadbury and public comments made by former Cadbury chairman Roger 
Carr urging changes as reasons for the review.
11
 The Takeover Panel 
released a lengthy consultation paper on June 1, 2010, entitled 
“Consultation Paper Issued by the Code Committee of the Panel: Review 
of Certain Aspects of the Regulation of Takeover Bids” (Consultation 
Paper), and invited comments regarding potential changes to the 
Takeover Code.
12
 After receiving public feedback from nearly 100 
sources, the Takeover Panel Code Committee (Code Committee)
13
 issued 
a report entitled “The Takeover Panel Code Committee Review of 
Certain Aspects of the Regulation of Takeover Bids” (Takeover Panel 
Report) on October 21, 2010—just nine months after Cadbury signed its 
agreement with Kraft.
14
 While the Takeover Panel Report does not 
specifically mention the Cadbury/Kraft acquisition, its tone is deliberate 
that the Takeover Panel does not want another British icon to go the way 
of Cadbury and places a newfound emphasis on non-shareholder 
constituencies in the hostile bidding and takeover context.
15
 
                                                     
7 See sources cited supra note 6. 
8 See Jonathan Petre, The Last Curly Wurly in Britain: End of the Line for Cadbury Factory 
that Kraft Vowed to Keep Open, THE DAILY MAIL, Jan. 2, 2011, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1343391/Somerdale-Cadbury-plant-End-line-factory-Kraft-
vowed-open.html. 
9 Zoe Wood, Takeover Panel to Look into Kraft’s Closure of Cadbury Factory, THE 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/mar/08/kraft-cadbury-closure-
takeover-panel.  
10 Takeover Code, supra note 3, at § A(11)(b); THE TAKEOVER PANEL CODE COMMITTEE, 
REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS, 2010, Consultation Paper 
Issued by the Code Committee of the Panel PCP 2010/2, 1, [hereinafter CONSULTATION PAPER], 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/ PCP201002.pdf.  
11 CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 1–2.  
12 Id. at 2. 
13 The Code Committee, one of the Takeover Panel’s two committees, is charged with the 
Takeover Panel’s rulemaking functions. Takeover Code, supra note 3, at § A(4)(b). 
14 THE TAKEOVER PANEL CODE COMMITTEE, REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE 
REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT] available at 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/2010-22.pdf; see also Jessica 
Hodgson & Dana Cimilluca, U.K. to Overhaul Merger Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2010, available 
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023040238045755 65712776857050.html 
(reporting the details of the Takover Panel Report). 
15 TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 3. Cf. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 
1 (referencing the Cadbury/Kraft merger and the widespread public debate that followed). 
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Major events often cause substantial legal reforms,
16
 but the public 
policy driving proposed revisions in the law should be unbiased and 
sound. This article will critique the proposals contained in the Takeover 
Panel Report on the premise that well-founded takeover law and 
regulation should focus on fair process and leave socioeconomic factors 
and foreign investment regulation to other areas of the law.
17
 After 
outlining the United Kingdom’s takeover regime and the Takeover 
Panel’s review, this article will critique two specific proposed reforms 
contained in the Takeover Panel Report, and will point out an alternative 
proposal the Takeover Panel missed that could better satisfy its goals.
18
 
This article will conclude by calling for additional research. 
 
II.    THE EVOLVING U.K. TAKEOVER REGIME 
The Takeover Code, first introduced in 1968, is a collection of 
mandatory rules governing companies that are listed on national stock 
exchanges in the United Kingdom and have their registered offices in the 
United Kingdom.
19
 The Takeover Code’s mission is to ensure fair 
treatment of shareholders and promote integrity in the financial 
markets.
20
 The Takeover Code focuses on accurate and sufficient 
disclosure of information to shareholders so that they may decide on the 
merits of a takeover, and on equal and fair treatment of all shareholders 
in takeovers.
21
 Additionally, the Takeover Code places certain 
restrictions on company boards so that they may not interfere with 
shareholders considering the merits of a takeover proposal or undertake 
actions that would frustrate meaningful shareholder choice.
22
 The 
Takeover Code, however, is not concerned with the business, strategic, 
or financial benefits or risks of takeovers and expressly states that these 
benefits and risks are to be judged by target companies and their 
shareholders.
23
 Further, the Takeover Code disclaims any position on 
antitrust or competition matters.
24
 
The United Kingdom has long been a leading proponent of open 
markets, company neutrality, and shareholder empowerment in the face 
of hostile bids.
25
 To understand the effect of this regime, consider the 
                                                     
16 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).  
17 Michael R. Patrone, An International Comparison of Corporate Leeway to Ward-Off 
Predators, 25 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. LAW 355, 358 (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743845. 
18 There are several other proposed changes that merit analysis and review, but the length of 
this article requires a narrower scope. 
19 Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(3)(a). 
20 Id. § A(2)(a).  
21 Id. 
22 E.g., id. at r. 21. 
23 Id. § A(2)(a).  
24 Id. 
25 See generally Companies Act, (2006), Vol. 3 CURRENT LAW 1, (U.K.); Companies Act, 
(1985), Vol. 1 Current Law 1, (U.K.). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 8 
67 
U.S. merger boom of the 1980s.
26
 With the advent of junk bond 
financing and creative schemes like two-tier, front-end loaded tender 
offers,
27
 hostile bidders could take over target companies with futile 
resistance by economically coercing the target’s shareholders into 
quickly tendering their shares.
28
 This approach was a method of choice 
for raiders in the United States, where the only real obstacle was the 
limited federal protection of the Williams Act—requiring tender offers to 
be held open for twenty days.
29
 Before the shareholder rights plan, 
dubbed the “poison pill,” U.S. companies and shareholders were at the 
mercy of hostile acquirers.
30
  
Shareholders in the United Kingdom, however, did not face this 
dilemma. Under the Takeover Code, which applies to all listed 
companies headquartered in the United Kingdom, two-tier tender offers 
are prohibited.
31
 Additionally, under mandatory bidding requirements, a 
shareholder must bid for all of the target’s shares once he or she obtains 
control.
32
 Unlike other jurisdictions, company control in the United 
Kingdom is met at a much lower threshold for regulatory purposes, and 
is defined in the Takeover Code as “an interest, or interests, in shares 
carrying in aggregate 30% or more of the voting right . . . of a company, 
irrespective of whether such interest or interests allow de facto 
control.”33 The United Kingdom incorporated these provisions into the 
Companies Act of 1985, and retained them in the U.K. Companies Act of 
2006 that officially gave the Takeover Code a statutory basis.
34
 The 
Takeover Code still contains these provisions today.
35
 
In light of the many protections that the Takeover Code affords 
shareholders, it also restricts the actions of management in the face of a 
bid for the company.
36
 The Board Neutrality Rule, a cornerstone of the 
                                                     
26 See generally CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS’ BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL 
BURNHAM AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS (Penguin Books 1989) (1988) (highlighting 
Michael Milken’s career developing risky, and perhaps fraudent, schemes for financing corporate 
takeovers); BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR 
NABISCO (Harper Business 2008) (1990) (detailing the leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco). 
27 A two-tier front-end loaded tender offer, also called a “Saturday night special,” is a coercive 
offer structure. Typically, the raider offers cash on a first-come, first-served basis for the first-tier 
(the number of shares needed to obtain majority control) and subordinated notes for the second-tier 
(the remaining shares). See Patrone, supra note 17. 
28 See id. at 355. 
29 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2010) (as amended by the Williams 
Act of 1968). 
30 See generally MOIRA JOHNSTON, TAKEOVER (Beard Books 2000) (1986) (explaining the 
hostile takeover process through the lens of three historic examples). 
31 See, e.g., Takeover Code, supra note 3, § B(1). 
32 Id. at r. 9.1(a); see also CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 10 (citing the Takeover 
Code, supra note 3, at § B(1), “if a person acquires control of a company, the other holders of 
securities must be protected”). For the parallel provision in the European Union Directive on 
Takeover Bids, see Council Directive 2004/25, art. 5, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 17 (EC) [hereinafter 
Directive]. 
33 Takeover Code, supra note 3, § C; see also Directive, supra note 32 (“The percentage of 
voting rights which confers control . . . shall be determined by the rules of the Member State in 
which the company has its registered office.”).  
34 Companies Act, (2006), Vol. 3 CURRENT LAW 1, 804–19 (U.K.). 
35 Takeover Code, supra note 3, §§ A(3), C(6). 
36 E.g., id. at r. 21.1. 
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U.K. takeover regime, prevents management from taking any frustrating 
action when it has reason to believe that a bona fide bid for the company 
is imminent.
37
 If management wishes to undertake such action, it can do 
so only with advance approval of shareholders at a general meeting.
38
 
Thus, U.K. companies cannot enact takeover defenses or engage in other 
tactics that would prevent shareholders from considering a direct bid.
39
 
Management’s role in this scenario is limited to communicating 
information with shareholders, and is mandated by the Takeover Code to 
express an informed opinion on the merits of the bid with the aid of 
unbiased, independent advisors.
40
  
In addition to its storied role in the United Kingdom, the Takeover 
Code served as the model for the European Union Directive on Takeover 
Bids (Directive), which includes such provisions as the aforementioned 
mandatory bidding rule and the Board Neutrality Rule.
41
 Furthermore, 
the Takeover Code’s General Principles are identical to those in the 
Directive.
42
 The United Kingdom formally adopted the Directive by 
virtue of the Companies Act of 2006, but this had little practical effect on 
the rules that govern hostile takeovers in the United Kingdom since its 
laws already contained most of the provisions.
43
  
The Companies Act of 2006, in addition to providing a statutory 
basis for the Takeover Code, gave the Takeover Panel a defined role and 
statutory powers.
44
 The Takeover Panel was established by statute in 
1968, along with the Takeover Code, as an independent body whose 
membership is comprised of professionals appointed by governmental 
bodies, non-governmental organizations, and the Takeover Panel itself.
45
 
The Panel is charged with overseeing and regulating the transactions that 
the Takeover Code governs, including the bidding process and mergers.
46
 
The role of the Takeover Panel grew and strengthened in 2006 when it 
became the regulatory authority that oversees and implements the 
Directive in the United Kingdom, in addition to administering the 
Takeover Code.
47
 As the regulatory watchdog on mergers and 
acquisitions in the United Kingdom, the Takeover Panel has a powerful 
voice with companies, the government, and the public, giving substantial 
weight to its recommendations for changes to the Takeover Code.
48
 
 
                                                     
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See id.; see also Patrone, supra note 17, at 356. 
40 See CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 66–67. 
41 Directive, supra note 32, at art. 9; see also Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(2)(b). 
42 See Directive, supra note 32, at art. 3; Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(2)(b).  
43 See Companies Act, (2006), Vol. 3 CURRENT LAW 1, 804–48 (U.K.). 
44 Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(3); CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
45 Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(4)(a); see also Panel Membership, THE TAKEOVER 
PANEL, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/panel-membership (last visited Dec. 5, 2011). 
46 Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(1); see also About the Panel, THE TAKEOVER PANEL, 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/about-the-panel (last visited Dec. 5, 2011). 
47 CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
48 E.g., Matthew Curtin, Evolution, Not Revolution, for U.K. Takeover Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
21, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023040238045755661 33711792398.html. 
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III.    THE TAKEOVER PANEL’S REVIEW OF THE TAKEOVER CODE AND 
REVISED PHILOSOPHY 
On February 24, 2010, the Takeover Panel announced the beginning 
of its review of the Takeover Code, citing widespread public and 
government criticism about the Takeover Code in light of Kraft’s 
acquisition of Cadbury.
49
 The Takeover Panel’s review of the Takeover 
Code is flawed because the Takeover Panel changed its focus from 
shareholders to stakeholders, and it failed to perform enough research to 
support its proposals. These flaws are evident in the Takeover Panel’s 
reason for initiating the review, the review process itself, and the 
conclusions of the review. 
 
A. The Takeover Panel Lost Sight of its Focus to Protect Shareholders 
The Takeover Panel reiterated the concern that the Takeover Code 
fosters an environment where hostile bidders can too easily take control 
of companies.
50
 Neither the mission of the Takeover Code nor the 
governing general principles, however, lists protecting target companies 
from hostile bidders as an objective of the takeover regime. The 
Takeover Code identifies shareholders, not companies, as the 
constituency that the Takeover Code seeks to protect.
51
 Despite the 
Takeover Code’s focus on shareholders, the Takeover Panel never 
suggests that the U.K. takeover regime disadvantages shareholders, and 
never asserts that Cadbury’s shareholders did not receive adequate 
protection from the Takeover Code, unless it was implying indirectly that 
Kraft had misled Cadbury shareholders about its plan to move production 
to Poland.
52
 
As part of the Consultation Paper’s invitation for comments, the 
Takeover Panel presented general statistics about company bids for the 
four years leading up to the Takeover Panel’s review process.53 Of the 
                                                     
49 CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
50 Id. at 3–4. 
51 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, §§ A(1)–A(2), B(1)–B(6).  
52 See id.; CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 3–4; TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra 
note 14, at 3. 
53 CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 4. The Takeover Panel provided the following data 
for the four-year period in the United Kingdom ending Mar. 31, 2010: 
Type of bid Total Percent of all bids 
Formal offers for U.K. companies 472 - 
Formal offers not initially recommended by 
the target’s board 
72 15.25% 
Formal offers still not recommended by the 
target’s board when published 
55 11.65% 
Formal published offers still not 
recommended by the target’s board at the end 
of the offer period 
40 8.47% 
Successful offers not recommended by the 
target’s board at the end of the offer period 
27 5.72% 
Offers that lapsed at the end of the offer 
period 
13 2.75% 
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472 offers made for U.K. companies during that period, the targets’ 
boards disapproved of only seventy-two (15%).
54
 Of these hostile offers, 
shareholders approved only twenty-seven and the rest either lapsed or 
turned into friendly negotiations such as Cadbury and Kraft.
55
 Thus, in 
the four years prior to the Takeover Panel’s investigation, only 15% of 
bids were true hostile offers, and of those, only 37.5% led to a takeover.
56
 
Put differently, of the 472 offers made during a four-year span that 
included a merger wave, only 6% were successful hostile bids—an 
average of seven hostile takeovers per year.
57
 One would expect this 
number to be higher in light of the blanket U.K. prohibition against 
companies frustrating bids.
58
  
Despite these statistics, and lack of any other empirical or statistical 
evidence, the Code Committee concluded, in the Takeover Panel Report, 
that it is too easy for hostile bidders to take over companies under the 
current U.K. takeover regime, and that the Takeover Code puts 
companies in a disadvantaged position, which is detrimental to 
shareholders.
59
 The Code Committee cited the views of commentators 
and respondents, but neither identified who these commentators and 
respondents were nor explained their views in any detail other than the 
general conclusion that companies have an unfair disadvantage to hostile 
bidders.
60
 Further, the Code Committee failed to explain how a 
disadvantage to companies is a de facto disadvantage to shareholders, 
particularly in a context where companies’ and shareholders’ interests 
can sharply diverge.
61
  
After hastily concluding that the Takeover Code disproportionately 
provides an advantage to hostile bidders, the Code Committee examined 
the negative effects that this advantage has upon companies and their 
employees, but not shareholders.
62
 These negative effects led the Code 
Committee to suggest changes to the Takeover Code to alleviate the 
perceived injustices.
63
 The Code Committee even listed the role of 
shareholders under the Takeover Code as a factor that gives hostile 
bidders a tactical advantage and has a negative effect on companies.
64
 
This approach is troublesome because the Takeover Code’s mission is to 
protect shareholders, not target companies and their employees.
65
 
                                                                                                                       
 
54 Id. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 Id. 
58 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 21; CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 4. 
59 TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 3. 
60 Id. The Code Committee did, however, list the names of the ninety-seven respondents who 
did not comment on a confidential basis. Id. at 26. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 3, 8, 9, 10. 
63 Id. at 10. 
64 See id. at 4. 
65 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(2)(a) (stating that the purpose of the code is “to ensure 
that shareholders are treated fairly and are not denied an opportunity to decide on the merits of a 
takeover and that shareholders of the same class are afforded equivalent treatment by an offeror”). 
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Further, the Code Committee’s aim at “redressing the balance in favour 
of the offeree company”66 is misguided because it is facially outside the 
scope of the Takeover Panel’s duties and it is substantively unclear 
whether it will benefit shareholders.
67
  
The Takeover Panel, as the agency that administers the Takeover 
Code, was justified in its decision to conduct a review.
68
 The problems 
with its review, however, begin with the manner in which it was 
conducted. First, the Takeover Panel should have conducted a 
meaningful study to determine whether hostile bidders are unduly 
advantaged under the current U.K. takeover regime. Relying instead on 
the views of commentators and respondents without citing any evidence 
other than a list of factors is both arbitrary and capricious. As the 
organization charged with protecting the interests of shareholders, the 
Takeover Panel should have been more thorough and truly investigated 
the effects of the current takeover regime instead of relying upon the 
wave of polarized public opinion following the Cadbury/Kraft 
acquisition.
69
  
To improve its review process, the Takeover Panel could have 
collected additional data on both hostile and friendly bids in the United 
Kingdom and comparable jurisdictions to determine the U.K. takeover 
regime’s effect on hostile bidders and companies.70 Such information as 
acquisition premiums, bid conditions, and forms of consideration would 
be very helpful in determining whether hostile bidders have an unfair 
advantage in the United Kingdom and would have allowed the Code 
Committee to conduct a more meaningful analysis. Data from the United 
States would be helpful for comparison as well, as its takeover regime 
allows target companies broad leeway to respond to unsolicited takeover 
bids, including adopting takeover defenses and undertaking frustrating 
action, so long as it is reasonable.
71
  
B. The Takeover Code with the Board Neutrality Rule Appears to Have 
Been Effective 
The United Kingdom, by adopting the Board Neutrality Rule in the 
Takeover Code and adopting the Directive, consciously decided to limit 
the role of target company management in the face of a bid by leaving 
the bulk of the responsibility and authority to target company 
shareholders.
72
 It should come as no surprise then, that companies like 
Cadbury must look to their shareholders to fend off a hostile takeover 
                                                     
66 TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 3. 
67 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, §§ A(2)(a), B(1)–B(6). 
68 See Companies Act, (2006), Vol. 3 CURRENT LAW 1, 804-5 (U.K.). 
69 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(1). 
70 The data contained in the Consultation Paper was a good start, but is insufficient to conduct a 
meaningful statistical analysis on the effects of The Takeover Code on hostile bids. See 
CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 4. An empirical study on the issue would be very 
worthwhile before the United Kingdom amends The Takeover Code. 
71 E.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953–55 (Del. 1985). 
72 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 21; Directive, supra note 32, at art. 9. 
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and may only disseminate information and express an opinion on the bid 
under the Takeover Code.
73
 Thus, it is misguided to argue that hostile 
bidders have an unfair advantage over target companies because the 
Takeover Code deliberately restrains target companies so that their 
shareholders have the freedom to evaluate the merits of a bid for the 
company and decide whether to accept or reject the offer.
74
 The focus of 
the inquiry should instead be whether hostile bidders have an unfair 
advantage over target company shareholders under the current U.K. 
takeover regime.
75
 The Code Committee, unfortunately, never directly 
made that distinction but instead concluded that the hostile bidder had an 
advantage over the target company and therefore over company’s 
shareholders.
76
 
Second, the Takeover Panel should have investigated whether a 
hostile bidder’s advantage actually has a negative effect on the 
shareholders of target companies.
77
 Even if the Takeover Panel’s 
investigation found that the current takeover regime makes it “too easy” 
for hostile bidders to succeed, it is highly unlikely that the data would 
show that this advantage has any meaningful impact on shareholders. 
This conclusion naturally flows from the very Guiding Principles that the 
Takeover Code is based upon—that all shareholders should be treated 
equally and that target shareholders, not target companies, should be the 
true decision makers in takeovers.
78
 Since a majority of shareholders 
must approve any takeover, and the Takeover Code requires all 
shareholders to receive equal consideration for their shares, it is hard to 
imagine a situation where a hostile bidder’s advantage would negatively 
affect shareholders, unless the shareholders felt a sentimental attachment 
to their shares of the target company. The Takeover Code’s mandatory 
bidding rules further bolster this position, as a hostile bidder can only 
buy up to 29.9% of a company on the open market before having to 
make a bid for the remainder of the shares at a fair price.
79
 Thus, the 
protections of the Takeover Code probably negate any hostile bidder’s 
advantage. 
To evaluate whether a hostile bidder advantage indeed has a negative 
effect on shareholders, the Takeover Panel could have utilized the same 
data for acquisition premiums, bid conditions, and form of consideration 
used to determine whether hostile bidders have an advantage.
80
 Further, 
                                                     
73 Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 21. 
74 Id. §§ B(1)–B(3); see also id. at r. 21. 
75 See id. § B. 
76 See TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 3 (“[T]he Code Committee has concluded 
that hostile offerors have, in recent times, been able to obtain a tactical advantage over the offeree 
company to the detriment of the offeree company and its shareholders.”). 
77 See id.  
78 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, §§ B(1)–B(6); see also Rohwedder & MacDonald, supra 
note 6. 
79 Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 9.1(a); see also CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 
10 (citing General Principle 1 of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, “[I]f a person acquires 
control of a company, the other holders of securities must be protected.”). 
80 See sourced cited supra notes 68–69. 
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data from shareholder votes on solicited and unsolicited bids would be 
helpful as well, as a narrow majority could indicate a negative effect on 
shareholders when compared to offers that receive a substantial majority 
of shareholder votes.
81
 Data from comparable regions and the United 
States would also be helpful to put the report’s statistics in a meaningful 
context.
82
 Without supporting evidence, however, the Takeover Panel 
Code Committee’s hasty conclusion that hostile bidders have a tactical 
advantage, and that this advantage negatively affects companies and 
shareholders, threatens the integrity of the Takeover Code and its 
Guiding Principles.
83
 
In addition to conducting an insufficient review process, the Code 
Committee misinterpreted and wrongly distorted the Takeover Code’s 
philosophy and mission by taking it upon itself to protect the interests of 
U.K. companies and employees rather than shareholders.
84
 The 
Companies Act and Takeover Code clearly state that the Takeover 
Panel’s objective is to ensure that shareholders have sufficient 
information and free choice, not to help U.K. companies remain 
independent.
85
 Companies have boards of directors and employees have 
unions and labor officials to serve their interests; the Takeover Panel’s 
duty is to protect shareholders.
86
 
The Takeover Panel undoubtedly came under significant pressure 
from both the public and government officials after Kraft’s acquisition of 
Cadbury, but this pressure is misplaced on the Takeover Panel and 
should instead be directed at Cadbury’s shareholders. Kraft’s hostile-
turned-friendly acquisition of Cadbury was a textbook example of the 
U.K. takeover regime functioning properly: Kraft made a bid directly to 
shareholders and the Cadbury board, after gauging shareholder 
sentiment, negotiated a friendly merger with Kraft.
87
 Shareholders, not 
the Takeover Panel, decided to accept Kraft’s proposal and facilitated the 
sale of the British icon to a non-British company.
88
 Further, although 
Kraft indicated that it was averse to job cuts in the United Kingdom, 
layoffs are a common—if not expected—result of mergers and buyouts 
as consolidating operations and eliminating duplicative functions are 
                                                     
81 This data, however, may instead only be indicative of the acquisition premium. 
82 See sourced cited supra notes 68–69. 
83 Compare TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 3 with Takeover Code, supra note 3, 
§§ B(1)–B(3). 
84 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, §§ B(1)–B(6). But see Companies Act, (2006), Vol. 3 
CURRENT LAW 1, 804 (U.K.) (“The Panel may do anything that it considers necessary or expedient 
for the purposes of, or in connection with, its functions.”). The Code Committee recognized that 
certain proposed changes would significantly enlarge the scope of the Takeover Code, but failed to 
recognize that the Takeover Panel Report’s focus on companies and their employees achieves this 
undesired result. See TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 5.  
85 Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(1). See Companies Act, 2006, 804 (U.K.) (“The Panel 
may do anything that it considers necessary or expedient for the purposes of, or in connection with, 
its functions.”). 
86 See sources cited supra note 85. 
87 See Patrone, supra note 17, at 358; Jones, supra note 1. 
88 de la Merced & Nicholson, supra note 4. 
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traditional means of achieving merger value.
89
 Cadbury shareholders, by 
supporting Kraft’s acquisition proposal, may have decided that Kraft’s 
offer price provided more value for their shares than the combination of 
Cadbury’s inherent long-term value, its 186-year storied history, and the 
additional jobs an independent Cadbury provides to the United 
Kingdom.
90
 The report, however, failed to mention how much Kraft’s 
assurances affected shareholder decision making. Thus, the public 
criticism on the Takeover Code is misplaced and should instead focus on 
target company shareholders—whose apparent values and priorities, as 
evidenced by their actions, differ from those of the critics who support 
U.K. takeover reform. If a majority of Cadbury shareholders wished for 
Cadbury to remain independent and wished to keep jobs in the United 
Kingdom, they would most likely have voted “no” on the merger 
proposal and Kraft would not have acquired Cadbury. As company 
shareholders and owners, however, they are free to sell their stakes as 
they please. 
As a foremost advocate for free markets, the United Kingdom 
established a takeover regime that seeks to impose as little restraint as 
possible—from either government or target companies—on both 
solicited and unsolicited bids.
91
 The Takeover Panel, as an independent 
regulatory agency, should be free from political pressures and economic 
nationalism sentiment and should continue its focus on ensuring fair 
treatment of shareholders, rather than shift course and seek to protect 
U.K. companies and their employees as the Code Committee proposes.
92
 
Economic nationalism and job losses, not shareholder disadvantages, are 
the foundation of the public criticism surrounding the Cadbury/Kraft 
acquisition.
93
 These interests are better left to other areas of law, like 
labor and foreign investment, rather than takeover regulation.
94
 Instead of 
caving under public pressure and heeding to the political winds, the 
Takeover Panel and Code Committee should have reiterated its position 
as an independent, unbiased, and objective regulator whose purpose is to 
ensure the unprejudiced, fair treatment of shareholders.
95
 The Takeover 
Panel Code Committee’s silently revised philosophy is without merit and 
the Takeover Code should not adopt it.
96
 
 
                                                     
89 See BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S LEADING 
CORPORATIONS 76–77, 164–70 (1998). 
90 While Cadbury shareholders did not expressly state this choice, it is inherent in their “yes” 
vote on the merger proposal. Some shareholders may argue that they did not support cutting Cadbury 
jobs in the United Kingdom, but this could have easily been made a condition to the merger 
agreement. 
91 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, § B; Patrone, supra note 17, at 356, 358. 
92 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, §§ A, B; TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 3. 
93 See Rohwedder & MacDonald, supra note 6. 
94 Patrone, supra note 17, at 358. 
95 Companies Act, (2006), Vol. 3 CURRENT LAW 1, 804–5 (U.K.); Takeover Code, supra note 
3, § A(1). 
96 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, §§ A(2), B(1)–B(6). 
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IV.    THE TAKEOVER PANEL’S PROPOSALS WILL LIKELY HURT 
SHAREHOLDERS 
An analysis of the Takeover Panel’s proposals shows that some of 
the proposals may fail to benefit and in fact may hurt the shareholders. 
The first proposal changes the virtual bid period, and the second removes 
deal protection measures and break fees. 
 
A. The Virtual Bid Period Proposal 
In the Takeover Panel Report, the Code Committee recommended 
shortening the virtual bid period, placing additional requirements on 
potential acquirers during and after the virtual bid period, and expanding 
the list of triggers for the proposed four-week offer period.
97
 The Code 
Committee believes that the existing virtual bid period gives offerors a 
“tactical advantage,” stating that the “virtual bid period . . . can be long 
and drawn-out and this can adversely affect the conduct of the offeree’s 
business and the offeree company board’s negotiating position with an 
offeror.”98 The Code Committee believes that the current Section D “put 
up or shut up” regime is effective, but that a potential offeror can avoid 
this regime by announcing “that it is considering making an offer but 
without committing itself to doing so.”99 The Code Committee believes 
that this leaves target companies “under siege” from unsolicited offerors 
for prolonged periods of time, which prevents the company from 
focusing on its normal business.
100
 This concern is somewhat ironic since 
management operates the company’s business for the benefit of its 
shareholders, but it is possible that a prolonged virtual bid period may 
decrease productivity and therefore the enterprise and market value of 
the company’s shares. It is curious, then, that the Code Committee did 
not cite this concern and rather focused upon target companies’ 
management and employees as the intended beneficiaries of this rule.
101
  
The Code Committee’s oversight, however, does not end with 
protecting the incorrect constituencies from prolonged virtual bid 
periods. To fix the perceived imbalance from virtual bid periods in favor 
of offerors, the Code Committee recommended further regulating the bid 
period, specifically amending the Takeover Code to require that an 
announcement be made following an approach, naming the potential 
offeror, which triggers the Section D “put up or shut up” period of the 
Takeover Code.
102
 The Code Committee proposed a rule that allows 
either the potential offeror or target to make the announcement.
103
 From 
                                                     
97 TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 11; see also CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 
10, at 66. 
98 TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 4. 
99 See id. at 11 (defining “virtual bid”); see also sources cited supra note 3 (explaining the 
Section D “put up or shut up” regime). 
100 TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 12. 
101 See id. at 11. 
102 Id.; see also Takeover Code, supra note 3, § D. 
103 TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 11. 
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the date of the announcement, the potential offeror will have twenty-
eight days to announce either a firm intention to make an offer, under 
Rule 2.5, or that it will not make an offer and be subject to the Rule 2.8 
six-month regulatory standstill period.
104
 The only exception to the 
twenty-eight day period the Code Committee provides is if both the 
offeror and offeree company jointly petition the Takeover Panel to 
extend the timeline for good cause.
105
 
While it is true that unsolicited acquisition interest can be disruptive 
to a company’s operations, the Code Committee’s recommendations 
focus on this tangential issue to the detriment of the underlying 
acquisition process itself. Mergers, acquisitions, and potential takeovers 
are, by nature, disruptive. The sale of a company is the most significant 
and emotional point in its history.
106
 Thus, it is understandable that a 
byproduct of the process may be a distraction from the target companies’ 
day-to-day activities, but to spite the entire process in the name of 
partially alleviating one of the side effects is irrational and ultimately 
harms the very constituency that the Takeover Panel is protecting—the 
shareholders.
107
 
First, the ability of the target company to unilaterally start the four-
week offer period gives the target company’s insiders—not 
shareholders—undue leverage over a potential acquirer that can be 
exploited for self-interest.
108
 Because the target company is not required 
to share information with the potential offeror, the potential offeror must 
operate without the data it may need to determine whether an offer for 
the entire company is feasible. The potential offeror will have access to 
publicly available information through other sources, but this alternative 
due diligence process will inevitably take additional time. Thus, a target 
company can put a potential acquirer at a substantial disadvantage by 
triggering the start of the offer period and requiring the potential acquirer 
to make an offer decision before it is ready to do so.
109
 Even if the 
Takeover Code requires the company to show cause or some other 
substantiation before it announces the identity of a potential offeror and 
triggers the twenty-eight day offer period, ensuring that the potential 
offeror or its agent did indeed approach the target, over-eager investment 
bankers hunting for a deal or arbitrageurs fishing for tips could 
                                                     
104 Id.; see also Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 2.5, 2.8. 
105 TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 11. 
106 I borrowed the sentiments for this comment from my Mergers and Acquisitions professor at 
Harvard Law School, the Honorable Chancellor Leo. E. Strine, Jr., to whom I am indebted for my 
appreciation of corporate law.  
107 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(2)(a). 
108 There are many examples where courts are concerned with the possibility the board is acting 
in its own self-interest. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 
1985) (Moore, J.) (“Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its 
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders . . . .”) (emphasis added). It is 
important to note that while I certainly do not suggest that the Delaware courts have binding 
authority over U.K. law, the principles of equity—namely, the fiduciary duty of loyalty—in the 
United States and United Kingdom share the same common ancestry. See generally SARAH 
WORTHINGTON, EQUITY 8–12 (2d ed. 2006).  
109 See TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 11. 
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inadvertently satisfy this requirement.
110
 This also would be unfair to 
potential offerors and place them at a tactical disadvantage that is not 
justified by the minor “siege” the target company faces from a virtual bid 
period.
111
  
Second, even if the target company does not preemptively trigger the 
start of the offer period, the four-week offer period still puts the potential 
offeror at an undue disadvantage because, unlike in friendly negotiations, 
the potential offeror is not guaranteed access to the target’s nonpublic 
information before or during the offer period, and the Takeover Panel 
Report makes no recommendations for allowing potential offerors access 
to this information.
112
 Thus, a potential offeror will be burdened in its 
due diligence process when deciding whether to make an offer, and may 
not be able to make the determination at the end of the four-week period. 
Because companies are only required to make public filings at certain 
intervals, a target company can strategically time its information releases 
to frustrate the potential offeror’s due diligence process and ensure that 
the information needed to determine whether an offer is financially 
feasible is unavailable. 
Because the Code Committee’s proposed changes only provide for 
an exception to the four-week period if both the potential offeror and 
target company jointly petition the Takeover Panel, the Code 
Committee’s proposal to shorten the virtual bid period is likely to result 
in three different outcomes, none of which benefit the shareholders of 
target companies. First, companies who are not prepared to decide 
whether to make a bid at the end of the four-week period are more likely 
not to make offers and be subject to the six-month regulatory standstill 
period. Because potential acquirers will always bid higher than the 
current market price for all of the target company’s shares, shareholders 
will lose this opportunity to realize more value for their shares.
113
 
Second, potential offerors who have been rushed in their decision-
making processes but decide to still make bids will adjust for the increase 
in uncertainty and risk by offering less for the targets’ shares to 
compensate for the higher risk premium.
114
 This is unfortunate for 
shareholders of target companies because potential acquirers presumably 
would offer more per share if they had additional time to complete their 
due diligence, which ultimately results in target company shareholders 
                                                     
110 See id. 
111 See id. at 12–13. 
112 See id. 
113 While there is no rule that requires offeror companies to bid higher than the current market 
price, an offeror could always purchase shares on the open market and simply pay the market price, 
without offering a premium, in the short run. But see Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 9.1 
(requiring a shareholder to make a bid for the remainder of a company’s shares once he attains 
control, as defined an aggregate of 30% or more of a company’s voting rights). 
114 For example, a potential offeror may use an equation like P = E(1 + G)N/(1 + R)N+1 to value 
the company’s stock at time N+1, where P is the price the offeror will pay, E is earnings per share, G 
is the growth rate of earnings, N is the number of years that the earnings will grow, and R is the 
desired rate of return. Uncertainty and risk will decrease G and increase R, thus driving down P. See 
generally JAMES ENGLISH, APPLIED EQUITY ANALYSIS: STOCK VALUATION TECHNIQUES FOR WALL 
STREET PROFESSIONALS (2001).   
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realizing less value for their shares. Finally, potential acquirers may 
make highly conditional offers or later withdraw their offers upon 
learning new information.
115
 This is also a terrible scenario for target 
companies and target company shareholders because other investors will 
see the targets as damaged goods and the target’s shares are likely to 
decline in market value.  
It is important to note that the primary constituency for the Takeover 
Panel is shareholders, but the Code Committee failed to present any 
evidence or arguments that indicate that a shortened offer period benefits 
shareholders.
116
 Additionally, only two potential counterarguments were 
presented in the initial Consultation Paper: (1) that the target company 
“is only truly under ‘siege’ . . . once the fact of the potential offeror’s 
approach has been publicly disclosed and an offer period has 
commenced,” and (2) the target company can “resolve the situation by 
publicly disclosing the potential offeror’s existence and identity and 
seeking a ‘put up or shut up’ deadline from the Panel immediately 
thereafter.”117 Foremost, these potential counterarguments do not address 
the issues facing shareholders. Further, these counterarguments were not 
even addressed by the Takeover Panel Report.
118
 Before accepting the 
premises that (1) the virtual bid period places an undue burden on target 
companies by subjecting them to being “under siege” for prolonged 
periods, and (2) this “siege” is detrimental to shareholders of target 
companies, the Code Committee should have conducted a meaningful 
study and gathered empirical data to establish or rebut the validity of 
these concerns.
119
 Instead, the Code Committee wrongly accepted these 
two assertions as given and used them as the basis for its first proposed 
amendment to the Takeover Code.
120
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
115 But see Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 2.4, n. 1 (placing certain requirements on 
conditions and pre-conditions to offers). 
116 See TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 11–13. 
117 CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 74; see also Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 2.4 
(permitting a target company to request the Takeover Panel to impose a deadline for the potential 
offeror to clarify its intentions. The Takeover Panel will only impose such a deadline, however, upon 
request from the target’s Board of Directors). 
118 See TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 11–13. 
119 The Consultation Paper presented statistics on the number of “put up or shut up” deadlines 
that the Takeover Panel set since Rule 2.4’s introduction in 2004. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 
10, at 70. From August 2004 to March 2010, the Takeover Panel imposed “put up or shut up” 
deadlines in sixty-one instances on sixty-seven potential offerors. Of these, twenty-four (35.8%) 
announced firm intentions to make offers and forty-two announced that they would not make an 
offer (62.7%). Id. The remaining potential offeror had its “put up or shut up” deadline withdrawn at 
the request of the target company’s board of directors. See id. These statistics, however, only 
indicate the number of instances of “put up or shut up” deadlines, and not the effect of these 
deadlines or the extent of losses target companies suffered as a result of being “under siege” during 
the virtual bid period. An empirical study on the issue would be very worthwhile before the United 
Kingdom amends The Takeover Code. 
120 TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 10, 11–13.  
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B. The Proposal to Prohibit Deal Protection Measures and Break Fees 
The Code Committee’s second proposed amendment in the Takeover 
Panel Report is for the Takeover Code to impose a general prohibition on 
deal protection measures and inducement fees “strengthening the 
position of the offeree company.”121 As with the virtual bid period, the 
Code Committee made this recommendation without conducting any 
empirical studies or collecting any data whatsoever on deal protection 
measures and inducement fees.
122
 Further, the majority of comments that 
the Code Committee received favored allowing, but further regulating, 
inducement fees so long as they are de minimis (generally capped at 1% 
of the offer price), as well as deal protection measures.
123
 Thus, the 
Takeover Panel Report’s recommendation has neither the support of data 
nor public sentiment, and the Code Committee instead rests its argument 
solely upon its own arbitrary conclusion that these measures lead to 
fewer competing offers and less favorable terms for competing offers, 
citing only the “Panel Executive’s experience of current market 
practice.”124 The Code Committee also proposed that there should be an 
exception to this prohibition of inducement fees and deal protection 
measures in the limited situation where a target undertakes a formal, 
public auction process to sell the company.
125
 
The Code Committee asserted that it needs to prohibit deal 
protection measures and inducement fees, rather than leave potential 
offerors and target companies to bargain over such matters in the free 
market, because the Code Committee believes that target companies are 
at a substantial disadvantage and cannot negotiate with offerors at arm’s 
length.
126
 The Code Committee further believes that it has become 
common practice for offerors to insist on the highest allowable 
inducement fees and maximum permissible deal protection measures, 
despite the absence of any supporting data.
127
 Assuming, arguendo, that 
the Code Committee made a genuine factual finding on the issue and was 
concerned about unduly burdensome inducement fees and deal protection 
measures, why not simply recommend reducing the maximum allowable 
inducement fee and restricting allowable deal protection measures 
instead of banning them altogether?
128
 Further, if these measures are so 
detrimental to target companies and their shareholders, why does the 
Takeover Panel Report recommend an exception to the prohibition for 
public auctions of companies?
129
 
                                                     
121 See id. at 10, 13–16. 
122 See id. at 13–16; Cf. id. at 14 (citing the Takeover Panel Executive’s “experience of current 
market practice,” but not any data or the results of any studies). 
123 Id. at 13–14. 
124 Id. at 14. 
125 Id. at 16. 
126 Id. at 14. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. at 16. 
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The Takeover Panel Report’s approach to inducement fees, 
commonly referred to as “break fees” or “termination fees” in the United 
States,
130
 is misguided and ultimately deprives target company 
shareholders from realizing the full value of their shares. Inducement 
fees are generally only payable after specific triggering events—usually 
the target board recommending a competing offer after entering into an 
acquisition agreement with the offeror.
131
 Currently, inducement fees are 
permissible under the Takeover Code so long as (1) they are de minimis 
(usually capped at 1% of the offer price), and (2) the target company 
confirms to the Takeover Panel that it believes the inducement fee is in 
its shareholders’ best interests.132 The Code Committee offered no 
evidence, however, to show that this regime unduly disadvantages target 
companies.
133
 Instead, the Takeover Panel Report arbitrarily relies on the 
argument in the Consultation Paper that inducement fees “may lead to a 
reduction in shareholders’ funds . . . without any clear benefit being 
obtained by offeree company shareholders.”134  
In addition to not providing any evidence on inducement fees, the 
Code Committee failed to respond to any counterarguments to its 
position in the Takeover Panel Report.
135
 The sole argument that the 
Takeover Panel introduced in favor of inducement fees, that an offeror 
may not be willing to make an offer in the absence of an inducement fee, 
was only addressed in the initial Consultation Paper and only focuses on 
a narrow area of potential offers.
136
 While the absence of inducement 
fees may indeed dissuade potential offerors from making offers in certain 
instances, the argument fails to capture the larger picture of how 
inducement fees can provide value to offerors and shareholders alike. It 
is well established, and can be partially inferred from the Consultation 
Paper’s potential counterargument, that conducting due diligence and 
entering into an agreement to purchase a company is both time 
consuming and expensive for potential offerors. These costs must be 
accounted for by the offeror, and are often defrayed by the use of 
inducement fees in the event that the deal falls apart. Thus, if the 
Takeover Panel bans inducement fees, two outcomes are likely, and both 
are worse for target company shareholders than the current regime. First, 
                                                     
130 The Takeover Code and Code Committee define an inducement fee as “an arrangement 
which may be entered into between an offeror or a potential offeror and the offeree company 
pursuant to which a cash sum will be payable by the offeree company if certain specified events 
occur which have the effect of preventing the offer from proceeding or causing it to fail (e.g. the 
recommendation by the offeree company board of a higher competing offer).” CONSULTATION 
PAPER, supra note 10, at 81–82 (citing Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 21.2, n. 1). 
131 See id. at 82. 
132 Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 21.2; see also CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 
82. 
133 See TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 13–16. 
134 CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 83; see also TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra 
note 14, at 14. 
135 See TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 14; see also CONSULTATION PAPER, supra 
note 10, at 83. 
136 See CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 83; see also TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra 
note 14, at 13–16. 
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as the Consultation Paper suggests, there will likely be fewer offers for 
companies.
137
 This is because offerors may identify targets they can 
acquire for attractive prices, but may be unable to afford their own offer-
related costs for any one or more of three reasons: the deal falls apart, 
management revises its stance and instead recommends another offer, or 
shareholders vote against the proposed deal.  
Alternatively, potential acquirers are likely to offer lower prices for 
target companies if the Takeover Code bans inducement fees. This can 
be explained through the two essential prongs of an offer: price and 
certainty.
138
 Inducement fees both increase the likelihood that the target’s 
shareholders will approve the agreed-upon acquisition and that the 
potential acquirer will be reimbursed for part of its expenses if the deal 
falls apart. In an efficient market, which the United Kingdom strives to 
maintain, this increase in certainty—and corresponding decrease in 
risk—will be of considerable value to the potential acquirer and 
accordingly something for which the potential acquirer will increase its 
bid. Although the risk of paying the inducement fee if the deal is not 
consummated still exists for shareholders, this risk will be overshadowed 
in the long-run by the number of deals that will be completed at higher 
prices per share.
139
 
Other deal protection measures, in addition to inducement fees, 
similarly add value to a merger transaction and can be both valuable and 
beneficial to target company shareholders. The Code Committee failed to 
recognize this point, and instead recommended that the Takeover Code 
ban other deal protection measures as well, with very few exceptions. 
Notably, the Consultation Paper focused on exclusive inducement fee 
agreements, non-solicitation (or “no shop”) agreements, notification 
agreements, “matching rights” (or “topping rights”), confidentiality 
agreements, and “force the vote provisions.”140 The Consultation Paper 
presented the counterargument, in favor of deal protection measures, that 
these measures are subject to the target company board’s fiduciary 
duties.
141
 This creates a “fiduciary out,” but the Consultation Paper 
ultimately dismissed this point because it is likely to result in litigation 
over whether specific actions are proper discharges of fiduciary duties, 
which disadvantages target companies.
142
 The Code Committee 
addressed these measures in the same breath as inducement fees, and 
recommended a general prohibition against their use. The prohibition 
came with the following limited exceptions: instances where a company 
                                                     
137 See CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 83. 
138 Certainty can also be termed “risk.” I attribute the price and certainty approach to the 
excellent instruction I received from leading practitioners, specifically Mark Gordon of the law firm 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz and Peter J. Halasz of the law firm Schulte, Roth & Zabel. 
139 The Takeover Panel and Code Committee do not provide data to prove or disprove this 
assertion, but an empirical study on the issue would be very worthwhile before the United Kingdom 
amends The Takeover Code.  
140 See CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 86–91 (briefly outlining these measures).  
141 See CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 92–93. 
142 See id. 
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initiates a formal, public auction process to sell itself,
143
 confidentiality 
agreements for sensitive information provided during the offer process, 
non-solicitation agreements for the offeror’s customers or employees, 
and agreements to provide information necessary for regulatory 
approvals.
144
 
Once again, the Code Committee failed to provide any evidence or 
data to support its assertion that deal protection measures unduly harm 
target company shareholders and recommended that the Takeover Code 
be amended to impose a general ban on these measures.
145
 While these 
measures may be restrictive on target companies and preclude target 
company shareholders from certain opportunities, they provide a great 
deal of certainty for offerors, for which offerors will compensate these 
shareholders. The Takeover Panel Report neither raised nor addressed 
this argument, which is unfortunate because the proposed amendment 
destroys this value for both potential offerors and target company 
shareholders. Similar to the ban on inducement fees, this Takeover Code 
amendment is likely to lead to fewer offers and lower offers for target 
companies, which ultimately deprives target company shareholders from 
realizing the full value of their shares. 
The Takeover Panel Report and Consultation Paper focus a great 
deal on target companies not being able to bargain at arm’s length for 
inducement fee arrangements and deal protection measures, asserting 
that these have become standardized in the market.
146
 If this were truly 
the case, a more appropriate means of regulation would be to put target 
companies in arm’s length bargaining positions with potential offerors 
rather than ban practices that generate value for which acquirers are 
willing to pay. The Takeover Panel Report’s proposal, however, takes an 
overly paternalistic approach in its recommendation to prohibit these 
devices altogether—an approach under which there are no discernible 
winners and many losers, namely, shareholders.  
 
V.    AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL – ABOLISH THE BOARD NEUTRALITY 
RULE 
Even if the Takeover Panel meant to protect all stakeholders’ 
interests, the Panel failed to identify a proposal that would potentially 
serve the stakeholders better—that is, to abolish the Board Neutrality 
Rule. The Code Committee now believes that the Takeover Code, 
including the Board Neutrality Rule, places companies at a substantial 
disadvantage to bidders and that the takeover framework should not 
unduly favor particular parties.
147
 To fix this perceived shortfall in the 
takeover framework, though, the Code Committee advocates making the 
                                                     
143 TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 16. 
144 Id. at 15. 
145 See id. at 10, 13–16. 
146 Id. at 14; CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 86, 91–93. 
147 See supra notes 58–67 and accompanying text. 
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process more difficult for would-be acquirers.
148
 This approach does not 
make sense and is not consistent with the Takeover Code General 
Principles.
149
 Assuming, arguendo, that the current takeover framework 
does indeed place companies at a substantial disadvantage,
150
 why not 
alleviate this disadvantage by changing how the Takeover Code regulates 
target companies in the face of a hostile bid? Why is the United 
Kingdom so married to the idea of the Board Neutrality Rule if its own 
takeover watchdog unequivocally states that it places companies at a 
disadvantage?
151
  
Within the Takeover Panel Report, there has been a significant shift 
in intended beneficiaries of the U.K. takeover regime, from the Code 
Committee’s perspective.152 The Board Neutrality Rule originally 
protected shareholders and still exists to serve their interests and ensure 
that they can exercise meaningful choice when evaluating a friendly or 
hostile bid.
153
 In making its proposals, however, the Takeover Panel 
Code Committee never substantively argued that the Board Neutrality 
Rule now disadvantages shareholders; it only argued that the rule 
disadvantages companies.
154
 In order to rectify the situation, the Code 
Committee proposed that bidders and companies should both be 
disadvantaged for the takeover framework to fulfill its goal of serving 
shareholders.
155
 The confusion does not stop there, however, because the 
Code Committee did not substantively argue that these proposals are 
designed to benefit shareholders, but other stakeholders—namely, 
employees.
156
 The current framework under the Takeover Code is 
designed for the benefit of the shareholders, but it unduly disadvantages 
companies. If the Takeover Panel Report’s proposals pass, the 
framework will equally disadvantage would-be acquirers and bidders, 
just to protect stakeholders the framework should not protect.
157
 
In order to best address the concerns introduced by the Code 
Committee, the United Kingdom would be better off abolishing the 
Board Neutrality Rule than implementing the Code Committee’s 
recommended changes. The Board Neutrality Rule, strictly implemented, 
benefits shareholders because it guarantees they can consider a bid for 
the company without management taking defensive action to frustrate the 
bid.
158
 Presumably, this will generate higher bids for shareholders 
because hostile bidders do not have to account for the cost of 
management’s frustrating actions, takeover defenses, or waging a 
                                                     
148 TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 3–4. 
149 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, § B. 
150 A point that I disagree with and attempted to rebut earlier. See supra Part III. 
151 TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 4. 
152 Compare Takeover Code, supra note 3, §§ B(1)–(6), with TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra 
note 14, at 10. 
153 Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 21.1–2. 
154 See TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 4. 
155 Id. at 2–4. 
156 See id. at 10. 
157 See id. at 2–4, 10. 
158 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 21.1–2. 
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takeover battle into the bid price. Although some distinguished 
practitioners argue that forcing a bidder to deal with the board is the best 
way to maximize shareholder value,
159
 others argue that, in the simple 
context of a direct bid to shareholders, a rational bidder would bid a 
higher price if he did not have to expend resources to overcome 
resistance or finance a takeover battle.
160
 
This simple example changes, however, when the Takeover Panel’s 
proposed amendments to the Takeover Code enter into the equation.
161
 
At this point, it is unclear whether the Board Neutrality Rule and the 
Takeover Panel’s new proposals for bidders or a regime like Delaware’s, 
where bidders may negotiate with management,
162
 will more effectively 
maximize shareholder value.
163
 From a strategic standpoint, however, 
one would presume that a would-be bidder would place a premium on 
being subject to fewer government regulations and higher deal certainty. 
Additionally, from a public policy standpoint, it seems far more desirable 
to have a takeover framework where bidders and companies are able to 
utilize all of their resources and act in their highest capacity.
164
 A 
potential takeover, whether successful or not, is a very disruptive and 
significant point in a company’s history,165 so the Panel’s reasoning for 
recommending the new proposals is irrelevant. Therefore, leaving both 
the would-be acquirer and target company to utilize their business 
judgment and all available tools is the most desirable way for the 
takeover regime to govern this situation. Under the Takeover Code and 
the Takeover Panel’s proposed changes, however, the situation is akin to 
sending two men out to duel with slingshots rather than guns.  
Further, the Takeover Panel subtly suggests an enlarged group of 
Takeover Code beneficiaries by stating that the Takeover Code should 
“take more account of the position of persons who are affected by 
                                                     
159 E.g., Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
819, 824–25 (2002). 
160 See id. But see John C. Coates IV, The Contestability of Corporate Control: A Critique of 
the Scientific Evidence on Takeover Defenses 70–74, Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, 
Econ., and Bus. Discussion Paper No. 265 (Sept. 1999), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/265.pdf (Professor Coates, the John F. 
Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics at Harvard Law School, cites several studies that show 
that companies with poison pills both received higher takeover premiums and outperformed the 
stock market in non-takeover situations. The article criticizes these studies, however, as being 
insufficient and potentially misleading and concludes that takeover defenses have no conclusive 
effect on stock price. Professor Coates argues, rather, that the mere availability of takeover defenses 
has the desired effect but that their adoption rarely has any effect.). 
161 See TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 10. 
162 Unless the bidder makes a direct offer to shareholders in the form of a tender offer. See, e.g., 
John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Divergence of U.S. and UK Takeover Regulation, 
REGULATION, Fall 2007, www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n3/v30n3-8.pdf. 
163 The Takeover Panel and Code Committee do not provide data to prove or disprove this 
assertion, but an empirical study on the issue would be very worthwhile before the United Kingdom 
amends its Takeover Code. 
164 But cf. Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 21.1 (requiring the board of the offeree company 
to obtain shareholder consent before taking any action that might frustrate a bona fide offer or 
possible offer, or deny shareholders the opportunity to accept or reject an offer on its merits). 
165 See TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 4. 
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takeovers in addition to offeree company shareholders.”166 If the 
Takeover Panel is serious about this goal, abolishing the Board 
Neutrality Rule would be a better approach to protecting non-shareholder 
stakeholders than recommending additional regulations. The best way to 
protect these interests is to allow company management to exercise its 
business judgment when evaluating takeover proposals and determining 
an appropriate response, which may include undertaking actions to 
frustrate the bid.
167
  
After serving as the model for board neutrality in the Directive, there 
has been changing sentiment in the United Kingdom about company law. 
The Code Committee is taking a much more pro-company approach to 
the takeover regime, yet maintains that the current regime need only be 
altered to alleviate its disproportionate effect on companies and, 
indirectly, employees.
168
 It is understandable that the United Kingdom 
would not advocate for repealing the Board Neutrality Rule given its 
heritage and role as model for the Directive.
169
 Thus, deeming the Board 
Neutrality Rule unfair and repealing it would be detrimental—if not 
catastrophic—to the efforts to uniformly implement the newly-passed 
Directive, specifically Article 9 on board neutrality. From a practical 
standpoint, repealing the Board Neutrality Rule so that companies could 
engage in takeover defense activities could be the best way to protect 
both shareholders and stakeholders. The Takeover Panel, as an 
independent agency free from the political process, should consider this 
proposal as a means of alleviating the negative effects a hostile-bidder’s 
advantage has upon target company shareholders—if such negative 
effects exist. 
 
VI.    CONCLUSION 
Throughout the Consultation Paper and the Takeover Panel Report, 
the Takeover Panel and Code Committee repeatedly suggest that boards 
of target companies either cannot or will not represent and protect their 
shareholders’ interests in the United Kingdom’s free market. 
Accordingly, the Takeover Panel believes that the Takeover Code should 
be less permissive and more paternalistic in order to ensure that 
shareholders’ interests are served. Sadly, this approach ignores the 
fiduciary and representative relationship that company directors share 
with their shareholders. If directors are unwilling to represent and serve 
the interests of shareholders, then shareholders will exercise their voting 
rights and elect new directors who will. If directors are unable to defend 
or serve shareholders’ interests, then shareholders will do so themselves 
by adopting provisions to strengthen their companies and by instructing 
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their directors to take additional measures and seek assistance. If offerors 
try to coerce or take advantage of shareholders, then shareholders will 
simply vote against the offerors and continue to enjoy the liberties and 
protections of the Takeover Code and the shareholder democracy 
philosophy. 
Unfortunately, these proposed amendments are not about 
shareholders at all, even if they pretend to be. The Takeover Code allows 
target companies to protect their shareholders and ensures that 
shareholders can protect themselves. The Takeover Code does not, 
however, allow target companies to protect their employees, their 
national heritage, or themselves at the expense of shareholders. 
Regrettably, these ideals are what the proposed amendments aim to 
achieve, even though many other areas of law already address them. The 
Takeover Panel, the world’s oldest institution on mergers and 
acquisitions, simply could not maintain its independence in the face of 
immense public outcry and government pressure. It did not want to bear 
the blame for allowing British icons to be swallowed by foreign 
corporate giants and for allowing U.K. jobs to be shipped overseas. So, 
although the Takeover Panel’s post-Cadbury proposal will serve many 
constituencies if adopted, it will harm the group that needs the Takeover 
Code’s protection most: the shareholders. 
This article raises more questions than it answers, but it is better to 
examine the law thoroughly and to carefully consider alternatives than to 
rush to legislate after an undesirable event occurs. Emotion and rhetoric 
are no substitutes for data and evidence, and the desire to eliminate all 
potentially negative side effects of a hostile takeover cannot overshadow 
the importance of a well-founded body of takeover law. Perhaps the 
Takeover Panel’s recommendations will ultimately benefit shareholders, 
but there is no way to know without further research, and thus the 
Takeover Panel should conduct more research before enacting its 
proposals.  
 
 
 
